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court opined that at a minimum, merely floating a kayak could be a
reasonable recreation experience on some reaches, while at a maximum, a world-class expert course requiring nearly the entire flow of a
given stream could also be reasonable. Thus, the reasonableness of an
applicant's sought recreation experience depended on the available,
unappropriated stream flow. As such, what constituted reasonableness
depended entirely upon the river basin.
Once the water court determined whether an RICD application was
for an objectively reasonable recreation experience in and on the
stream in question, then the water court needed to determine the
minimum amount of stream flow necessary to accomplish that intended recreation experience. Thus, the statute might require the
water court to weigh conflicting expert testimony given by course designers or other interested parties, and to make a finding as to the least
necessary stream flow to achieve an applicant's objectively reasonable
recreation experience. The court also made clear that the water court
could not take at face value the appropriator's suggestion, as set forth
in the application, of a reasonable recreation experience for the
stream involved, nor should the water court accept, without scrutiny,
the applicant's analysis of necessary stream flow to achieve that objective. In making its determinations, the water court must carefully
evaluate the Five Factors, giving presumptive effect to unrebutted
Board findings, and considering the Board's recommendation and any
other evidence submitted in the course of the trial.
Thus, the court held both the Board and the water court erred,
and remanded the case to the water court with instructions to remand
to the Board to determine whether the application comported with the
Five Factors.
David Michael Shohet
East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., No.
03SA372, 2005 Colo. LEXIS 230 (Colo. Mar. 21, 2005) (holding the
terms of a contract govern restrictive, contractually created water rights
and may not exceed the uses detailed in the contract).
East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC ("East Ridge") filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment against the Larimer & Weld Irrigation Company
("Irrigation Company"). East Ridge sought to change the point of diversion and place and the type of its water right pursuant to two contractual agreements. Conversely, the Irrigation Company claimed East
Ridge owned a water right perpetually restricted to irrigation use. The
Division 1 Water Court concluded the contractual nature of East
Ridge's water right perpetually restricted the use to irrigation purposes
only. East Ridge appealed the water court's decision to the Colorado
Supreme Court. In its appeal, East Ridge requested the court determine whether the contractual language prohibited conveying, chang-
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ing, or moving East Ridge's water right. East Ridge also raised the issue of whether it forfeited its water right by using the right for a nonspecified purpose.
In 1873 several individuals incorporated the Irrigating Ditch Company No.10 ("No. 10") for the sole purpose of irrigation. In 1879 Benjamin Eaton purchased all the rights, titles, and interests in the No. 10.
Each right, title, and interest expressly provided for the irrigation of
eighty acres of land. Eaton eventually conveyed all of the rights to the
Irrigation Company. East Ridge obtained a water right in the Irrigation Company through two contracts dated April 1878.
The supreme court began its analysis by defining mutual ditch
companies as quasi-public entities whose stock represents a definite
and specific water right. The court noted that, under Colorado law,
shareholders in a mutual ditch company may seek a change in their
water rights.
Since East Ridge owns a contractual delivery water right, the court
interpreted the terms of the contracts. The court noted the contracts
provided for a sufficient quantity of water necessary to irrigate eighty
acres of land. Accordingly, the issue was whether the irrigation of
eighty acres qualified as a descriptive or restrictive provision. The
court stated the contracts appeared facially ambiguous and it considered extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.
First, the court inferred the decrees adjudicated to the Irrigation
Company included East Ridge's water rights, and, thus, the explicit
terms of the contracts governed the water rights. Second, the court
noted other jurisdictions concluded that specific reference to irrigation of land was restrictive, rather than descriptive. In addition, the
minutes from the March 25, 1878, No. 10 shareholders' meeting suggested the restrictive nature of the irrigation provision. Third, the
court construed the contracts to allow both East Ridge and the Irrigation Company to receive the benefits of the bargain based on their
reasonable expectations because the facts indicated the shareholders
believed the provision restricted the use and the location of the water
rights.
In his dissenting opinion, justice Hobbs noted the early priority
date of the No. 10 Ditch water rights and pointed out the practical effect of the majority's holding that only those with the first and best
priority rights needed to restrict their use to irrigation, while all other
shareholders in the Irrigating Company could change their uses and
location. Injustice Hobbs' opinion, the majority's reasoning deprived
the earliest priority owners of fully realizing the modern, economic
value of their water rights, a result that was "shocking, unconscionable,
and contrary to Colorado law." Justice Hobbs felt the majority also
failed to consider the most important extrinsic evidence: the historical
context surrounding irrigation priorities. In conclusion, justice Hobbs
stated all water users on the same ditch must possess the opportunity to
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change water rights to other uses and locations. By only allowing some
shareholders on the ditch to change their water rights, the majority
failed to honor the original intent of the parties.
East Ridge's contracts contained terms that narrowed and limited
the scope of the agreement. Therefore, the court held the contracts,
rather than Colorado water law statutes, governed East Ridge's water
rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's decision and
prohibited changing the use or location of East Ridge's water rights.
Susan M. Curtis
In rePark County Sportsmen's Ranch, L.L.P., No. 01SA412, 105 P.3d
595 (Colo. Jan. 18, 2005) (holding an applicant that requests approval
of a plan for augmentation must prove that it can establish the timing
and location of depletions, and the availability of replacement water to
prevent injury from those depletions; and that in the absence of a
showing that out-of-priority depletions will occur when senior water
rights do not have a call on the river, or that depletions will be less
than its withdrawals because of anticipated return flows, an applicant
must replace 100 percent of its withdrawals from tributary groundwater
in an over appropriated basin).
In 1996, Park County Sportsmen's Ranch ("PCSR") filed an application with the District Court for Water Division 1 for conditional underground and surface water rights in the South Park region of Colorado on the South Platte River. PCSR also sought adjudication of a
plan for augmentation. Numerous parties objected to PCSR's application, and at the end of PCSR's case-in-chief, the water court dismissed
PCSR's application.
PCSR's proposed project envisioned pumping up to 140,000 acrefeet of groundwater from the underlying South Park Formation, a
saturated aquifer tributary to the South Platte River, using a series of
proposed wells on its property and delivering the water pumped from
the wells downstream to the City of Aurora. According to PCSR, the
pumping of the wells would create a cone of depression in the aquifer,
the underground storage vessel for which PCSR sought adjudication.
PCSR planned to store surface water, collected during periods of high
runoff through a system of diversions, in the underground storage vessel to recharge ponds located above the aquifer. PCSR also claimed
the right to store precipitation and irrigation return flows salvaged
from surface vegetation in the underground reservoir. PCSR's pumping would diminish the amount of groundwater flow to the South
Platte River from the aquifer, and the resulting cone of depression
would ultimately draw on and deplete the flow of the river.
PCSR initially proposed to replace our-of-priority depletions to the
South Platte River by utilizing the water pumped from its wells, and
previously decreed water rights in the area including three springs,

